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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the intersection of social images and perceptions of security in the 
countries of the South Caucasus to scrutinize contested patterns of belonging amid 
continued talk of a “new Cold War”. These case studies – embedded within the broader EU-
Russia context – shed light onto particular securitization practices and their constitutive 
motivations. To decode these ontological security rationales and divisions – around yet 
eerily familiar lines – is important in order to make sense of how and why the countries of 
the South Caucasus conceive of their surroundings as they do and what spaces for political 
manoeuvres emerge.       
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the coming-into-existence of the EU’s Eastern Partnership – as more diffe-
rentiated ENP approach – denominations of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine as countries which could be considered “in between” (Danii 
& Mascauteanu, 2011) the EU and Russia, within the “spheres of influence” or the 
“near abroad”, respectively, have featured quite significantly throughout all types 
of discourses. As the ENP/EaP was initially designed to avoid “new dividing lines” 
in Europe and aiming at the creation of a zone of stability, prosperity and security 
on the European continent, these re-emerging categorizations fit yet again in the 
emerging debate on a “New Cold War in Europe” within which these signifiers of 
belonging (Jerez-Mir et al., 2009) to a certain socially constructed and cognitively 
evaluated group regain immense importance (Weisel & Böhm, 2015). It is exactly 
within this foreign policy discourse that preferences, attitudes and alignments are 
constituted on the basis of collective identity constructions (Jussim et al., 2001). In 
other words: constituted on mechanisms of belonging and otherness. These 
discursive strategies of highlighting belonging to (imagined) communities 
(Anderson, 1996), yet security communities (Deutsch, 1957; Adler & Barnett, 
1998), could have been observed to be the cornerstones of securitization stra-
tegies of the EU and Russia1 vis-à-vis the common neighbourhood and of the 
countries of the common neighbourhood vis-à-vis the EU and Russia vice versa. 
The multitude of (discursive) positioning, making sense of the world and others, 
are part of an amalgamation of identity politics: of self-constituted and ascribed 
identities – the latter being supported by processes of socialization and 
conditionality, labelled as ‘Europeanization’ or ‘Russification’, respectively.  
In contrast to, but in relation with, the ideas of the debate on a potential new 
Cold War in Europe, this argument is substantiated by recalling a basic premise of 
securitization literature (Buzan, 1991; McSweeney, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan 
& Wæver, 2003; Buzan & Hansen, 2007; Balzacq, 2015) which has described the 
situation after the Cold War in Europe as to be defined by the presence of two 
Regional Security Complexes [RSC]: a European RSC and a post-Soviet one 
centred around Russia (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 397), which together built the 
European Supercomplex (2003: 437). Arguing that what Buzan and Wæver called 
                                                                                                                                       
1  See table 1 for an overview of prevalent security communities, amongst others not only the EaP, 
but the EEU, CIS and CSTO.  
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“separateness and involvement” as modes of interaction of the two latter RSCs 
could better be modelled as different conceptualizations of otherness with 
concrete images of amity/enmity informing and co-constituting the situation on 
the ground, the model presented here assumes that the bridge between the two 
regional foreign policies of the EU and Russia could be identified in them being 
different anchors of belonging, yet otherness. Within this complex, the dynamics 
of collective identity formation play an important role as they inform images and 
narratives of amity and enmity (Subotić, 2015) vis-à-vis the others. This function of 
othering is then one of conceptual and categorial boundary-drawing inherently 
linked to the struggle for/of (definitional/normative) power by and of all actors 
involved.  
Hence, this paper tries to map this variety of others and their varying defi-
nitions by looking at two arenas of collective identity formation (Mitzen, 2006) of 
and within the South Caucasus countries: first, the perspective of main foreign 
and security policies and, second, the societal perspective2. The time frame for this 
image analysis is 2011 to 2014. By shifting the attention from the EU and Russia as 
‘framing actors’ towards the perceptions of the countries in-between, the 
attention is yet again drawn back to their agency.  
 
 
IDENTITY (CHANGE), POWER AND FOREIGN/SECURITY POLICY  
The foreign policy-identity and the identity-security nexus are two academic com-
pounds which are vividly debated and tackled from a variety of positions. In this, 
the terminology referring to identity is multiple: “identification”, “attachment”, 
“categorization”, “self-understanding”, “role conceptualization”, “social location or 
position”, or “groupness” are just a few examples (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015: 3). 
The arising question of continuity and change within this is closely related to the 
agency vs. structure debate on which much ink has been spilled, not least in IR 
theory. This paper follows the poststructuralist approach on identity and foreign 
policy which postulates a dynamic and mutually constitutive relationship between 
them both. In other words, foreign policies are reliant upon representations of 
                                                                                                                                       
2  These identity constructions are a result of intrasocietal discourses: Renan called them „daily 
plebiscites“ (Harnisch, 2011:24). As such, surveys serve as representations of those plebiscites – 
and are considered to display notions of societal sense-making. 
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identity, but identities are constituted and reconstructed also through the formu-
lation of foreign policy. In this understanding, material forces and ideas are so inter-
linked in the discursive practice of foreign policy that the two cannot be separated 
from each another, they are indeed ontologically inseparable. However, the 
understanding of this (re-)construction of identity is often under-conceptualized 
and needs further elaboration.     
In accordance with early role theory sociologists, identity is here treated as 
layered and simultaneously constituted on mutually interacting levels of inter-
subjective meaning making (Harnisch, 2011). These two levels refer to a “domestic 
(internal) domain” and an “international (relational) domain” of identity construc-
tion. A ‘domestic domain’ is, thus, impossible other than in relation to an ‘inter-
national’ one. In this context, the fragile and ever-so-to-be-negotiated balancing 
act between the domestic and the international locus of one’s identity construction 
is to be found in the mechanism of ontological security-seeking. This deconstruc-
tion offers new perspectives on ‘internal’ motivations vis-à-vis ‘external’ ones, 
scattered by expectations and behaviour of oneself and the other – which are 
delineating identity and behaviour by enabling and constraining possibilities and 
expectations. These notions of spatial, temporal and social power highlight the 
practice of categorization and its inherent linkage to collective identity construc-
tions via subjective security perceptions by the virtue of defining the other – and 
the self. This ‘categorial power’ of defining in-category status cuts across the 
debate on ‘normative power(s)’ as this very act of defining in-category status could 
be theorized as an act of labelling something as ‘normal’. However, ‘categorial 
power’ is rather the outcome of a much more complex process of identity demar-
cations and takes into account not only representations of imaginary sets of 
belonging/otherness but ideological projections of power – of boundaries and 
borders connected with security discourses through their very implementations 
as discursive power (could) manifest(s) itself.  This socially diffused production of 
subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification is, in terms of Barnett and 
Duvall (2005), productive power. 
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IDENTITY POLITICS AND SECURITIZATION 
Switching away from the essentialist meaning of friends and foes in the Schmittian 
sense and their provokingly simple/under-complex and dehumanizing categori-
zations of others (Kteily et al., 2016), arguing in line with Mouffe (2005) opens up 
the discursive space in which images and narratives of enmity/amity are cons-
tantly invoked as instruments and methods to mobilize groups and foster in-
group cohesion (Alexander et al., 1999). These images and narratives which provide 
probabilistic heuristics about the other’s behaviour are understood as cognitive 
shortcuts towards reality and are a powerful tool of political discourse (Williams, 
2013; Chernobrov, 2016). Looking at how friends and foes are constructed in 
political discourse provides a powerful analytical tool for recent developments. 
Acknowledging this antagonistic constitutive dimension should be understood as 
admonition of Schmittian reflexes, to “think with Schmitt against Schmitt” (Mouffe, 
2005). Thus, images of amity and enmity are heuristic categories of (discourse) 
analysis rather than foundational principles. In this sense, these discourses re-
present discourses of danger (Stern, 2005) which discern the self from the other 
(Brewer, 1996; Campbell, 1998) and “tell […] what to fear” (Stern, 2005: 4). These 
evaluations construct subjective positions on the boundary of we and them 
(Connolly, 1985) and are reproduced through performance (Stryker, 2007). This 
reflex of “to fix where/who we are” is central to the production of in/security where 
the inside is rendered secure and the outside dangerous (Stern, 2005). This assign-
ment of ‘foreign threat’ represents a notion of securitizing the identity of the 
respective group – inherently linked to OST.  
 
 
ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY (SEEKING) AS SOCIAL MECHANISM 
BETWEEN THE “WE” AND THE “US” 
Ontological Security Theory (OST) (Steele, 2005; Mitzen, 2006; Lupovici, 2012) as a 
framework to understand behaviour in realms of security and perceptions of 
security (on a mostly state-centric level) has featured widely in the recent IR debate 
and turn on narratives (Huysmans, 1998; Alexander et al., 1999; Delehanty & Steele, 
2009). OST holds that the motivations for behaviour could be found in needs of 
holding and reconstructing a positive self-identity. This biographical continuity 
(of the state/society) in form of narratives and images of the self and the other is 
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sought to be institutionalized by routinized relationships with those significant 
others. Reducing uncertainty about the behaviour of those others and creating 
predictability are functions of this institutionalization of re-imagined relation-
ships. In line with an argument put forward by Chernobrov (2015), this paper 
suggests that narratives and images are instrumentalised within these co-
constitutive relationships: as OST assumes security to rest in an ever-so-positive 
representation of the self, narratives of othering and belonging are used as 
balancing mechanism of those relationships. Shedding further light onto the 
mechansims of OSS, this is particularly understood as balancing mechanism 
between the internal and the relational identity domain. 
The inherent drive for consistency (Festinger, 1962; Lupovici, 2012) within this 
system opens up space for two quite different strategies of dissonance reduction 
within the aforementioned discourses according to two types of dissonances: 
cognitive and ontological. First, consistent with the overall assumption that the 
aforementioned images of amity and enmity work as cognitive proxies for power 
configurations, OST puts forward that there’s a hierarchy of needs to be achieved 
by the state: first securing a positive self-conceptualization, then physical security. 
This rationale for a positive self-identity thus may lead to foreign policy choices 
inconsistent with physical security needs. In that scenario, images are strategically 
used as cognitive bridges between the (physical) security policy and ontological 
security needs in light of the strategic environment and perceived national security 
threats (Subotić, 2015). Second, otherness and belonging as distinct represen-
tations of those instrumentalised balancing methods of states’/societies’ drive for 
ontological security shape intergroup relations (relational domain): they stimulate 
the construction of security communities and provide incentives to repel 
outsiders (Subotić, 2015). Therefore, the ‘systemic structure’ is a function of other-
ness, and thus a function of belonging to an in-group vs. an out-group (cf. the 
English School).  
Here, image theory draws the connection between those actors’ images of 
others and theoretical considerations on approaches to security – and their 
potential resulting behaviour - as it holds that these images contain information 
about actors’ capabilities, intentions, previous experiences/memories as well as 
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perceptions of threat (Alexander et al., 2005; Gaufman, 2017) 3. In this context, 
captures of enmity/amity are conceptualized as representations of those social 
relations – which are then relatively durable, more stable evaluating indicators 
and patterns of social information on amity/enmity and, thus, defining mediators 
of intergroup behaviour in this net of relational others (Finlay et al., 1967).  
 
 
“THE SIGNIFICANT OTHERS” AND THE RELATIONAL IDENTITY LAYER: 
OTHERING IN EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS AS COMMON DENOMINATOR? 
Patterns of international institutional belonging (up to 2015) 
 CIS EurAsEC CU CSTO GUAM BSEC NATO ENP BSS TRACECA INOGATE 
Russia x X X X  X NRC # x  # 
Armenia x # X X  X IPAP X x X X 
Azerbaijan x   # X X IPAP X x X X 
Georgia #   # X X NGC X x X X 
Table 1. Patterns of international institutional belonging (up to 2015) 
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States, EurAsEC: Eurasian Economic Community, CU: Customs 
Union, CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organization, GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova): 
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, BSEC: Organization of the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation, NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ENP: European Neighbourhood 
Policy, BSS: Black Sea Synergy, TRACECA: (EU) Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, INOGATE: (EU) 
Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe. 
 
Rushing from one initiative to the other without having a significant outcome, 
EU-Russia relations have suffered from being under-defined, meaning that 
significant, long-term policy development was cast aside in favour of symbolic 
but rather superficial policy engagement (Kanet & Freire, 2012; Allison, 2013). The 
PCA with Russia signed in 1994 was framed by long and difficult negotiations 
with Russia pressing for a better deal and the EU as shaper of norms insisting on 
conditionality and norms convergence. Ever since then, it was possible to observe 
that the EU was identified by Russia as a power politics actor in ‘Russia’s 
neighbourhood’ (Made & Sekarev, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                       
3  The taxonomy of these images reads as follows: Ally (1: compatible, 2 and 3 equal), Enemy (1: in-
compatible, 2 and 3 equal), Dependent (1: incompatible, 2 and 3 lower), Barbarian (1: incom-
patible, 2 lower, 3 higher), Imperialist (1: incompatible, 2 and 3 higher) (Alexander et al., 2005: 
p.30). 
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However, strategic interaction – both on a policy level and in what could be 
observed as frames of the other to relevant in-group audiences - has been fairly 
limited or framed negatively under the impression of the first Chechen war and 
the Russian debt crisis. Despite this, the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia in June 
1999 reaffirmed the importance of Russia and post-sovereign principles 
(Haukkala, 2010). Russia’s Mid-Term-EU strategy 2000-10 can be regarded as a 
direct answer to that, already opposing the mentioned principles emphasizing 
sovereignty and interest-based cooperation (Kanet & Freire, 2012). Trying to 
establish EU-Russia relations in the first place, various aspects of common duty in 
the neighborhood were neglected in the policy documents, leaving behind 
fundamentally different interpretations of security and the way of implementing 
them - economic aspects always played a major role in this relationship. Putin’s 
presidencies initially included a “European Choice” and Russia’s cooperative role 
in the post-9/11 developments in combination with first signs of domestic 
liberalization boosted cooperation and emphasised equality in interstate 
relations (Hopf, 2008) but eventually just contributed to a more fuzzy 
constellation of EU-Russia relations with only virtual progress: the Four Common 
Spaces (2005) in the light of the Big-Bang enlargement and Russia’s rejection of 
the ENP, the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council because of Russia’s 
insistence of a special strategic partnership, not ranking it amongst the other 
eastern countries, and the Modernization Partnerships (2009/10) in light of the 
Caucasus crisis and thus the necessity to re-establish relations.  
According to Kanet and Freire (2012) “[c]ooperation on security issues between 
Brussels and Moscow has been rather limited”. Despite all efforts, the implemen-
tation has been slow and inconsistent: the external security pillar was under 
constant contestation without being able to find consensus on a denomination 
for the “common neighborhood”, thus revealing again fundamental differences 
and abstention from cooperation in security issues (Whitman & Wolff, 2010). At 
the same time, Russian leaders consider that NATO enlargement has reinforced 
‘old dividing lines’, despite cooperation under the NATO-Russia Council (Allison, 
2013). Moreover, the 2008 war in Georgia was a turning point for EU-Russian 
security relations (Kanet & Freire, 2012): on one hand, both Russia and Georgia 
blamed each other for having been the aggressor with the EU trying to mediate, 
on the other hand NATO enlargement was off the table for Georgia with the 
EUMM as a freezing exercise (Haukkala, 2010). In this context, the failed proposal 
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of a New Security Treaty for Europe by Medvedev highlighted yet again a strong 
othering position towards a common European security architecture and under-
lined differing views and interests of the EU and Russia (Kanet & Freire, 2012).  
Thus, EU-Russia relations persist of fundamentally different interpretations of 
(security) actorness and different modes of cooperation deduced from them. 
Russian and European policies imposed on the neighborhood have become com-
petitive regarding all these aspects in the last years, fostering the fear of 
alienation of CIS countries from Russia (Made & Sekarev, 2011). This was exempli-
fied by Lavrov’s assessment of the EaP as an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of 
influence which opposes Russian interests (Kanet & Freire, 2012), and the fact that 
both actors haven’t been able to find a common denomination for these countries. 
Approaches to design complementary policies – as seen above – have been 
rather limited in scope, coherence and support. The deepening constitution of the 
ENP in form of the EaP and Association Agreements (AA), thus, exactly constitutes 
what has manifested to have been a pivotal point for EU- Russia relations: a 
strong input of EU identity projection, of a redefinition of in-group belonging 
and, thus, a rather strong othering of the Russian position and vice versa.   
 
 
“THE SELFS” AND THE OSS MECHANISM BETWEEN INTERNAL AND 
RELATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 
COUNTRIES 
Frames of Belonging/Otherness in the Foreign and  
Security Policy Doctrines/White Papers 
When looking at images of amity and enmity in Georgian policy discourse, Russia 
is framed as an imperialist power whose actions range from active war pro-
motion, violating territorial integrity and creating de-facto occupied territories to 
limiting policy options and questioning state sovereignty. Georgia’s self-con-
ceptualization is coherently linked to ‘following a European way’, so that Russia’s 
actions are in particular seen as provocations and violations of the very self-
concept. As those actions go to the core of ontological security, having experienced 
conflicts with Russia in the recent past, its arms build-up, and recently perceived 
‘forced convergence activities’ in the neighbourhood contribute very negatively 
to its imperialist image. However, far from being coherent a region, all countries 
12 
of the South Caucasus feature very distinctive interpretations of the social context 
and otherness and belonging as shown by the analysis of images found in the 
policy documents:  
 
Country Images/Narratives of amity and enmity 
Armenia Russia: most important ally  
CSTO/CIS: institutional ally  
US/NATO: strategic/very selective ally  
EU: strategic, very selective ally  
Azerbaijan: Imperalisti / Babarian  
Turkey: Imperialist 
Azerbaijan Armenia: Barbarian  
Russia: strategic ally  
Iran: important ally  
Turkey and Georgia: strategic allies  
EU/NATO: strategic, selective ally 
Georgia Russia: Imperialist  
EU: strong, “natural” Ally  
NATO: strong Ally  
Turkey: Ally  
Ukraine: Ally 
Table 2: Images/Narratives of amity and enmity, own inductive policy text analysis 
 
Complex, mutually exclusive self-conceptualizations are reflected within frames 
of the major foreign policy and security documents – with profound implications 
for the co-constitutions of the in-group/out-group and adherent evaluations of 
the latter. At the basis of this lies the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which features as 
the most important issue in both Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s self-identifications, 
as both interpret Nagorno-Karabakh and its population as being integral part of 
its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national identity. It is not surprising that a 
conflict which is integrated into the very self-definition constitutes very negative 
perceptions of the involved other. Thus, both Armenia and Azerbaijan hold 
images of each other varying from barbarian to imperialist. It is within this 
context, that a net of other significant others is constructed through those lenses, 
in particular with a focus on national identity ties. Georgia is the only neighbour 
who is accepted as (selective) ally by both states – from that, perceptions of amity 
and enmity draw clear distinctions of (un)friendly others given their perceived 
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material and ideational positioning on self-conceptualization issues. Whereas 
Armenia sees Russia as most important ally and together with that the CSTO and 
CIS as institutional allies, Azerbaijan and Turkey are depicted as arch enemies. 
Coming from that, the EU and NATO are only seen as strategic and very selective 
allies. Vice versa, perceptions of security follow the same logic in Azerbaijan: 
Armenia is perceived as the barbarian other with Turkey, Georgia, and in 
particular Iran being strategic allies. It is noteworthy that also Russia is seen a 
strategic ally with the EU and NATO only featuring in situational identifications.  
It is only within those images of the others that material (here military) 
situational inputs are cognitively evaluated and reshaped – thus, Russia’s build-up 
is perceived as providing security guarantees to a certain extent by Azerbaijan 
and Armenia, whereas Georgia perceive this as fundamental challenge to its self-
conceptualizations.  Finding a balance between inputs of the EU and Russia as 
(non-)regional others and all other significant others in the region whilst navi-
gating between upholding and re-constituting codified behaviour and concep-
tualizations is an immense task for all countries under scrutiny.  For example, 
momentums of that can be identified in Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s sketchy 
evaluations of Russia and the EU whilst holding contradicting images of each 
other. There, it is to see whether potentially converging Russian-led integration 
projects would reconcile or foster those contradictions. Moreover, with Georgia 
identifying itself as fundamentally European, it is to see how this further frag-
mentation and recalibration of the South Caucasus will shape perceptions of 
otherness and how and if so these conceptualizations of otherness will contribute 
to friendly or unfriendly images vis-à-vis even further material inputs, perceptions 
of insecurity and, thus, a potential resort to old patterns. 
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As one main anchor of belonging and therefore source for constituting otherness 
vis-à-vis the others, the EU holds a particular role in the South Caucasus.  A sense 
of belonging to the EU is perceived very strongly in Georgia (65%) with rates of 
“equal support/don’t support” only at 17% – there’s merely a share of population 
rejecting the idea of belonging to the EU (only 8%). Nevertheless, from 2012 to 
2013, mentions of belonging fell from 72% and undecided accounts as well as 
othering positions rose from 13% and 3%, respectively. This tendency, even more 
prominent, is also observable in Azerbaijan: the share of population undecided 
IMAGES OF BELONGING/OTHERNESS IN THE SOCIETAL ARENA  
 
Figure 1. Support of country's  
membership in the EU (CRRC 2013) 
Figure 2. Support of country's  
membership in the NATO (CRRC 2013) 
Figure 3. Support of country's 
membership in the Eurasian 
Economic Community (CRRC 2013) 
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whether they support belonging to the EU or not nearly equalled the share of 
supporters (34%) with 32%. This is partly a result of rising support of the forth (up 
from 23% in 2012) and partly a significant fall of feeling of belonging to the EU 
(this number fell from 49%). Simultaneously, othering in terms of not wanting to 
belong to the EU rose from 12% to 18%.  These findings are consistent with obser-
vations for Armenia: there, the share of people rejecting the idea of belonging to 
the EU rose 10% to 23% within one year and now constitutes the highest figure of 
rejection in the South Caucasus. In line with this, perceptions of belonging 
decreased sharply from 54% to 41%. 25% are between the stools of those two 
positions. Not that surprising, membership aspirations for NATO are still the 
highest within the Georgian population: “fully support” and “rather support” 
account there for 58% of all replies. However, the share of (rather) non-supporters 
accounts for 12% – up from 6% the year before. In addition, rather indifferent 
views („equally support and don’t support“) gain more and more shares: in 2013, 
they represented 19% (in contrast to 14% in 2012). These rather indifferent 
attachments also now constitute the majority of replies by Azeri respondents: the 
number rose from 23% in 2012 to 32% in 2013. This change is in line with falling 
support rates – these went down in the same time frame from 45% to 31% and 
are now less than the indifferent ones – and rising non-attachment moves: these 
numbers went up from 14% to 18%. The same tendency is observable in Armenia: 
indifferent, yet undecided accounts represent the majority with 30% in 2013 (up 
from 26%). However, the share not supporting in any form NATO membership 
now is higher than the share rather feeling attached to it: 28% (2012:23%) 
compared to 26% (2012:33%).  The common denominator for perceptions of NATO 
attachment, thus, is rather a drifting away of the countries of the South Caucasus 
represented by falling numbers of support and rising numbers of undecidedness 
and rejection.  
It is necessary to put the before-mentioned figures of belonging/otherness 
into the complete neighbourhood context – to contrast them with perceptions of 
belonging/otherness to the Eurasian Economic Community. Unfortunately, the 
available CRRC 2013 dataset didn’t include this question for Azerbaijan so that 
only Georgian and Armenian perspectives can be displayed and compared 
consistently. Nevertheless, this depicts an interesting contrast between an EEU 
member (Armenia) and an EU-membership aspiring country (Georgia). Although 
with 30,9% being the half of the share of feeling attached to the EU, a sense of 
16 
positive alignment with the EEU is definitively acknowledged in Georgia. On the 
same time, othering of this perspective is the highest (22,4%) in comparison with 
other positions within Georgian society. 16,5% are yet undecided and a signi-
ficant share of 29,8% doesn’t know whether to differentiate or to belong to the 
EEU. The fragmentation of the South Caucasus in terms of belonging/otherness is 
rendered visible in particular by a comparison of those Georgian figures with 
those of Armenia: Whereas only 12,6% reject an idea of attachment with the EEU, 
over the half of the population (52,4) perceives this as desirable. This figure, thus, 
is approximately 13% higher than for the EU and even double when compared to 
orientations towards NATO.  Only 13,8% don’t know what to answer when being 
confronted with this question.  
As regional power, Turkey holds a significant position within the self-positioning 
of the Armenian and Azeri people – given the inverted identity function mentioned 
beforehand. Resources of identity construction in Armenia draw heavily on the 
Armenian Genocide and its non-recognition by Turkey (seen by them as per-
petrator, as barbarian other): as a consequence, 28% of Armenians identify Turkey 
as main enemy. Whereas people in Azerbaijan don’t mention Turkey at all when 
thinking of enemies, only 3% do so in Georgia, too. As another part of this equali-
zation, Turkey is seen as a main friend (91%) by Azerbaijan. On the other hand, 
these stratifications have led to mutual perceptions of enmity between Azer-
baijan and Armenia. Strikingly high figures of mutual mistrust, devaluation and 
thus, enmity, can be observed here: 90% of the people in Azerbaijan see Arme-
nians in a very unfavourable light which resonates with 66% of Armenians seeing 
Azerbaijan as main enemy. It is also remarkable that this question has a very 
polarizing effect in itself when being asked – 32% of Georgian’s don’t have an 
answer to that question or refuse to answer, with the latter option accounting for 
over three quarters of that figure.   
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Figure 4. Friends (first graph) and enemies (second graph) of the South Caucasus 
countries (CRRC 2013) 
 
Russia holds a quite particular role as constitutive other in the South Caucasus: 
whereas in Georgia – still evoking the 2008 war with Russia whilst constructing 
collective identity – 44% see Russia as main enemy, only 7% do so in Azerbaijan 
and a non-significant part identifies Russia as such in Armenia. However, as 
Georgia (only) and Azerbaijan (rather) hold negative opinions on Russia, Armenians 
by far see Russia with 83% as main friend. Whereas the axis of stratified relations 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan constitutes strict adherence to evaluated 
 
Turkey        Russia        USA        Azerbaijan         Other        No one          DK/RA
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia                                                            83                                                                 9       4    4
                                                                91                                                                    2    5
3    7                            83                       8           11                16                           24
Turkey        Russia        USA        Azerbaijan         Other        No one          DK/RA
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
                                                  66                                                                 28                     2
                                                               90                                                                     7     2
                             40                                3   4           17                                32
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different others in the logic of identity spill-overs and sameness/difference in 
attachment, Georgian people are the only ones mentioning the USA as main friend 
(31%). It is quite remarkable that the USA doesn’t feature in the list of significant 
others given the friend/enemy questions at all in the three South Caucasus 
countries, except in Georgia. This role decline is also observable for Iran (not 
accounting for any significant percentage above 5% in any of those polls.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
One basic premise of Buzan and Wæver’s work was that there were two RSCs to 
be found after the Cold War in Europe: a European RSC and a post-Soviet one 
centred around Russia, which together built the European supercomplex (Buzan 
and Wæver, 2003). This paper has argued that what Buzan and Wæver called 
“seperateness and involvement” within the European Supercomplex could better 
be modelled as different conceptualizations of otherness with concrete images 
and narratives of amity and enmity informing and co-constituting the situation 
on the ground. According to this model the bridge between the two regional 
foreign policies of the EU and Russia could be identified in them being different 
anchors of belonging, yet otherness – cutting across the dimensions of values 
and interests - serving as polarizing anchors of belonging and otherness: diffusing 
potentially mutually exclusive sets of ideational and material factors. These de 
facto contradicting images of allies vs. imperialist/barbarian others have an impact 
on those others, too: they, vice versa, mutually constitute images and narratives 
of otherness and belonging, which, in turn, amplifies the images of enmity/amity 
of those countries in-between, given ever so more distinctive patterns of align-
ment/alienation of those providing incentives.  
Within this complex, applying a twofold concept of identity – relational and 
internal – supplements the analysis strongly – as they inform images and narratives 
of amity/enmity vis-à-vis OSS mechanisms. Ontological security approaches 
provide understandings of (broader) situations based on behaviour which 
fundamentally is constituted by an actor’s need of ‘securing’ a certain self-con-
ceptualization. However, these social identities are rather exogenous to the system 
itself – which, in turn, leaves the question open why these specific self-concep-
tualizations are evoked. Thus, conceptualising and embedding OSS as balancing 
mechanism between those two identity arenas seems to significantly strengthen 
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the meaning of this otherwise rather generic mechanism. In this way, it was 
possible to see a limited trickle-down effect of security dialogues from elites to 
people as elites – as creators of the main policy documents – have much more 
ontologically fest positions. A drifting apart of positions of othering/belonging 
between elites and societies could be observed: leaving room for manoeuvre for 
other anchors to leverage those in terms of applied identity politics. 
Summarizing all those factors, the security outcome for the Countries of the 
South Caucasus is discouraging. They have witnessed a strong commitment to 
self-conceptualizations which are mutually exclusive. From that, securing these 
ontological standpoints has led to portraying the (not only) surrounding others as 
imperialist or even barbarian, as major security threats to the very own existence. 
Within this existential reasoning, even little changes in comparative (military) 
advantages constitute heightened perceptions of insecurity as those enmity 
lenses bundle negative out-group perceptions. It is within this ‘existenzialized’ 
context that intergroup boundaries are very clearly defined so that it is very 
difficult to overcome inherited patterns of contradicting self-conceptualizations 
and, thus, of negative intergroup evaluations. Seeing those factors as endo-
genous to a co-constitutive environment, changes to this setting could only be 
realized due to the diffusion of material and ideational factors as well as to expec-
tations of significant others. In this context, it is to see whether the diverse inputs 
of the EU and Russia are evaluated as being reasonably intense and (bene)fitting 
for the respective country as to implement these momentums into its self-
conceptualization and whether this would constitute a significant change in who 
is perceived as amicable or inimical other.      
In light of yet again rising populism and nationalism combined with abstract, 
undercomplex and openly aggressive reasoning, it is of utmost importance to 
decode these ontological security rationales and existenzialised categorizations  – 
around yet eerily familiar lines – to make sense of how and why these countries 
conceive of their surroundings as they do and what spaces for political manoeuvres 
emerge.    
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